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Abstract
Researchers studying the differential commitment of countries to intellectual property
rights, often appear to run into the claim that countries with a relatively higher and significantly
changing technological base (the developed countries) opt for relatively stronger protection,
whereas those with a relatively low and essentially unchanging technological base (the
developing countries) opt for weaker protection. While the reasons for such strategic choice may
vary between the two sets of countries, it appears to be a short step from the above assertion
to the claim that such behaviour on the part of the developing countries results in huge trade
losses for the developed countries. Using cross-country panel data for the period 1981-1995,
this paper finds that the generation of intellectual property or technological change (proxied by
private R&D investment) does not have any significant positive influence on the strength of
intellectual property protection that nations provide.
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Does Intellectual Property lead to Intellectual Property Protection?
The agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property issues (TRIPs) reached
in April 1994 under the aegis of the GATT/WTO, committed the member signatories to
harmonizing their intellectual property laws within a specified time frame.  It also served
to highlight the widely diverging strengths of protection that different nations provide to
intellectual property.  In the case of patent laws, for instance, nations have differed with
respect to coverage (in terms of, for instance, the broad categories of inventions
patentable), duration (or the number of years of protection granted), conditions for the
revocation of patents once granted (on account of 'non-working' or else compulsory
licensing under certain situations), when a patent application may be challenged (pre-
grant or post-grant opposition), enforcement procedures (whether or not preliminary
injunctions are allowed in case of an alleged infringement, who carries the burden of
proof), and so on.  Similarly, numerous differences have obtained across nations with
respect to the other instruments of intellectual property protection (copyrights,
trademarks, trade secret laws etc.) as well (Gadbaw and Richards 1988).
Researchers studying different countries' commitment to intellectual property
protection often appear to run into the claim, that countries with a relatively higher
technological base and exhibiting 'significant' technological change (the developed
countries) have an incentive to provide relatively stronger protection to intellectual
property, whereas countries with a relatively low and essentially unchanging
technological base (the developing countries) have little incentive to do so.  Thus,
countries such as the United States, Germany, Japan etc. provide relatively stronger
intellectual property protection, whereas many others such as India, Brazil, Argentina
etc. do not.  While this possibility has been acknowledged in the literature (McLeland
and O'Toole 1987; Frame 1987; Ginarte and Park 1997), few researchers have studied
it formally
1.  McLeland and O'Toole compare the relative commitments of developed
and developing countries in the area of pharmaceuticals, but their 'analysis' is limited
to the assertions that the "... LDC perspective is different primarily because there are
few research-based pharmaceutical companies located in those countries", and that
"[M]ost indigenous 'manufacturers are compounders who purchase the active ingredient
... and mix and package the drug ...".  They do not offer any evidence on these4
sweeping statements - how true this might be for, say, India, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba
etc; or whether their claims pertain to other industries as well
2.  Frame (1987) in a fairly
superficial paper, considers a group of 8 countries with a 'low' commitment to protect
intellectual property, and claims that U.S. trade losses on account of inadequate
protection and trade in counterfeit goods runs into several billions of dollars.  He does
not, however, show that the latter phenomenon is linked to the former set of countries,
nor whether the levels of protection obtaining in his set of countries is higher or lower
than those in other developing countries, nor what he means by 'low' levels of
commitment to protect intellectual property.  Ginarte and Park (1997), on the other
hand, attempt to study formally the relationship between the commitment to protect
intellectual property and various determinants.  They find weak evidence in support of
the above-mentioned claim that the less-developed countries are the ones with a
relatively weaker commitment to provide protection.  Their estimation, however, is likely
to be subject to considerable simultaneity bias, as they regress an index of protection
on R&D expenditure; for the latter is likely to be a function of the former, and taking
lagged values of the regressors (as they do) is not enough to take care of this
endogeneity bias.  Thus, the empirical evidence is thin and hardly supportive of any
generalisation.
This paper, therefore, attempts to examine empirically whether the generation
of intellectual property, or technological change, leads to the strengthening of laws
pertaining to its protection.  This relationship is captured at the economy-wide level,
employing cross-country data on the strength of intellectual property protection,
technological change and other country-specific control variables.  The estimation
results show unambiguously, that the generation of intellectual property or technological
change (represented by research and development expenditure) does not have any
significant positive effect on the strength of intellectual property protection provided by
nations (as represented by an index of patent rights).  It is our conjecture, that
intellectual property laws, as also other laws, are not variables automatically determined
by market forces, but are instead determined by a more complex and circuitous political
economy process. Consequently, they are slow to change and need not be responsive
to changes in the level of technological development of nations in any systematic
manner.5
Section 2 considers the arguments underlying the relationship sought to be
estimated in this paper in somewhat greater detail, and spells out the estimation model.
 Section 3 briefly discusses the data samples and the estimation procedure adopted.
  Section 4 presents the estimation results, and section 5 outlines some broad
conclusions.
2.  Intellectual Property and Its Protection: The Estimation Model
When considering a country's commitment to the protection of intellectual
property, an interesting question that has been raised in the literature is, which
countries provide strong protection and which ones weak protection?  Thus, Gould and
Gruben (1996) note that "... developing countries have traditionally offered shorter
periods of protection for patents than have developed countries".  Is the strength of
intellectual property protection that a country provides determined by the level of its
technological base and inventive effort, controlling for other relevant factors?  Stated
alternatively, ceteris paribus, do countries that exhibit a relatively low technology base
and a low level of inventive effort (primarily developing countries) opt for weak
intellectual property protection, and those that exhibit a relatively higher technology
base and a higher level of inventive effort (primarily developed countries) opt for a
régime of strong(er) intellectual property rights?
Low levels of inventive activity, as in many developing countries, imply the
availability of a relatively narrow technology base, and hence a range of goods and
services that is narrower, of poorer quality and possibly higher priced
3.  One way to
circumvent these disadvantages is to allow 'cheap' technology imports through imitation,
within a system of relatively weak intellectual property protection.  Thus, for instance,
some developing countries historically did not offer product patents on pharmaceuticals;
instead, they offered process patents, which implied that firms in these countries could
(and did) synthesize various drugs by alternative processes even when product patents
on these drugs were valid in other (developed) countries.
Once countries begin to invest 'sizable' proportions of their total product in6
inventive activity, as in newly-industrialized countries in the recent past and the older
industrialized countries earlier, they appear to switch to stronger protection of
intellectual property, because now there is something to protect. If they don't protect this
property themselves, they cannot reasonably expect other countries to protect it either.
 Can India, for instance, expect other nations to respect its claim over Basmati rice
when it doesn't provide for protection of 'geographical indications' itself
4?  Various
intellectual property instruments, therefore, are employed strategically to keep
competitors from gnawing away the profit margins through imitation.  In other words, the
generation of intellectual property brings in its wake measures to protect it.  For these
reasons, it appears - strategic reasons on the part of the technology-importing countries
or the South, and vested interests on the part of the technology-exporting countries or
the North - we may expect a positive relationship running from the level of inventive
effort or technological change in a country, to the strength of intellectual property
protection that it provides.
Thus, various arguments may be proffered - some to explain the behaviour of
net technology-importers and some to explain the behaviour of net technology-
exporters - to establish, à priori, a relationship between the level of inventive activity and
the strength of intellectual property protection across nations.  But how valid these
arguments are in practice, is not very clear from the available evidence.  This paper
attempts to bridge this gap between conjecture and the ground reality, by providing
further empirical evidence on the above-mentioned relationship.  Before proceeding to
the estimation we need to delineate the model.  For this purpose, we need to define the
regressand and the regressors.
The regressand
While ideally one ought to consider a range of intellectual property instruments
(patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets) in constructing an index of the strength
of intellectual property protection, in practice this may not be feasible on account of data
constraints, particularly in the case of developing countries.  This need not be a serious
limitation, however, in view of the fact that the inter-country variation in some
instruments such as trademarks and (to a lesser extent) copyrights has traditionally7
been rather small (Gadbaw and Richards 1988)
5.  Not considering the latter two
instruments in constructing an overall index of protection, therefore, should not prove
a serious omission.
There appears to be a consensus in the literature, that the most dramatic
differences in the protection afforded to intellectual property across nations, obtain in
the sphere of patents.  Patent protection differs across countries in several important
respects.  While in some countries a wide category of inventions are granted both
product and process patents (e.g. in Germany, Japan, UK, US), in some only process
patents were granted in certain areas such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals (e.g.
India, Mexico, Venezuela), and in some not even process patents may be allowed in
certain areas such as food products (e.g. India, Thailand, Venezuela).  Second, the
number of years of patent protection varies greatly between nations.  In some countries
patent protection lasts only five to ten years (e.g. Jordan, Sri Lanka); in others, it lasts
between 15 to 20 years (e.g. France, Germany, UK, US).  What complicates the
duration aspect further is the fact, that some countries measure patent duration from
the date of application for the patent (e.g. Japan, Jordan, Nigeria), others measure it
from the patent publication date
6 (e.g. Australia, Austria, India, Korea), and still others
measure it from the date the patent is granted (e.g. Canada, Mexico, Pakistan,
Portugal, Iceland).  Third, the patent laws in different countries may differ with respect
to the conditions under which patents may be 'suspended' once granted.  Thus, in some
countries patents may be suspended on account of 'non-working' or 'insufficient
working' (e.g. India), or else compulsory licensing (e.g. Australia, India, Ireland, Nigeria,
UK), or else national needs such as defence (e.g.Austria, France, Italy, Mexico) or
public health (e.g. Canada, France, India, Ireland, Nigeria).  Fourth, countries may differ
with respect to the ease with which patent claims may be challenged. While some
countries allow pre-grant opposition (e.g. Japan), others only allow post-grant
opposition (e.g. France, Germany, UK).  Fifth, countries may differ with regard to the
strength of enforcement procedures available to patentees and patent administrators.
  Thus, some countries may allow preliminary injunctions in case of an alleged
infringement (e.g. US), whereas others may not (e.g. India); again, in some countries
the burden of proof of an alleged infringement may be on the complainant, while in
others it may be on the appellant.  Many other aspects may be added to this list in8
describing the inter-country differences in patent laws.  Ginarte and Park (1997)
construct an index of patent rights focusing on the five important aspects of coverage,
duration, membership in international patent agreements, conditions for loss of
protection and enforcement mechanisms available.  The index ranges from zero to five,
with higher values of the index indicating stronger protection. We use this index of
patent rights (IP) as the regressand in this study
7.
The regressors
The hypothesis in question is whether countries with higher levels of inventive
activity or technological change, offer higher levels of protection to the fruits of such
activity.  We propose to represent inventive activity by private research and
development expenditure as a proportion of gross national product (PRDI), which is
obtained using cross-country data on R&D expenditure as a proportion of GNP (RDI)
8
and the government's share of gross domestic R&D expenditure (GOVSHRD).  The
reason we focus on private inventive activity is, that it is the private sector which
appears to demand the protection levels (high or low) that it considers suitable. 
Although all R&D expenditure does not necessarily translate into intellectual property,
this variable is more closely related to inventive activity than are, say, others based on
patent data
9.
The level of intellectual property protection that a country provides will also
depend on its capacity to do so, both its financial capacity as well as its human capital
capacity. Thus, countries with a larger surplus of financial resources are better able to
provide stronger protection, simply because they can afford to.  There are probably
large fixed costs of providing such protection - for this would include infrastructure for
patent offices, patent examiners, databases, enforcement officers, courts etc. - which
countries with larger surpluses would be in a better position to provide.  We represent
this financial capacity by gross domestic savings as a proportion of GDP, lagged one
period (St-1).
In addition to financial resources, the requirement of competent patent
examiners (technically skilled for the purpose), patent lawyers, enforcement personnel9
(suitably informed), judges etc., would require suitable human capital resources.  We
capture this human capital resource requirement in terms of the average number of
years of formal schooling of the population aged 15 or more (EDU).
The market size would partly determine how much profit potential any intellectual
property has and may, therefore, influence the strength of intellectual property
protection that a government chooses to provide over time.  Thus, larger markets,
insofar as they indicate a greater profit potential ceteris paribus, may attract greater
intellectual property protection.  We represent this factor by the current GDP per capita
(GDPPC).
Finally, political stability appears to be important for the development of
institutions in a country.  It stands to reason, that countries faced with political instability
may lack the conditions (the political consensus and/or the decision-making apparatus
and/or the infrastructure), relatively speaking, to introduce and implement what they
consider to be the appropriate institutions - intellectual property laws in the current
context.  We represent this factor by a fairly comprehensive 'state failure' dummy, using
data on genocides, politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars and abrupt régime
changes towards autocratic rule (for the data see Esty et.al. 1998).  The instability
dummy (ID) is defined to equal 1 for a country exhibiting one or more of the above-
mentioned phenomena in any year, and 0 otherwise.
Estimating R&D expenditure
A problem with the set of regressors discussed above, is the likely endogeneity
bias involved in using variable PRDI or private R&D expenditure share in the national
product; for it may be argued that inventive activity is itself a function of the strength of
protection provided to it.  To take care of this problem we propose to first estimate PRDI
as a function of various exogenous variables, and then use the estimated RDI values
(PRDIHAT) in lieu of PRDI.  The exogenous variables used in instrumenting PRDIHAT
are briefly discussed below.10
R&D expenditure is found to be pro-cyclical for several reasons.  One important
reason is the increased availability of internal funds (Hall 1992; Himmelberg and
Petersen 1994), while a second reason is demand-pull forces indicating increased
profitability (Geroski and Walters 1995).  We represent the former by gross domestic
savings as a proportion of GDP, lagged one period (St-1), and the latter by the ratio of
current GDP per capita to the previous period's GDP per capita (∆GDPPC)
10.  Note,
that we did not want to introduce current GDP as a regressor to capture the pro-
cyclicality of PRDI, because that would leave the causation mechanism opaque.
Human capital is central to research and development (Romer 1990). 
Furthermore, more educated countries are better able to absorb and innovate on the
inventions made elsewhere (Nelson and Phelps 1966).  Researchers often use literacy
rates to capture this factor, although literacy statistics (based on whether the
respondent can sign his name, or whether he can identify a certain number of
characters of a given language etc.) are not particularly indicative of individuals' skill
levels. Data on technical personnel - scientists, engineers, technicians etc. - might be
more relevant, but are harder to come by, especially for developing countries.  Again,
primary school enrolment rates would not be adequate for the task, because too many
countries have already achieved full enrolment at this level; quite apart from the fact
that we should use a stock and not a flow measure of human capital.  We capture the
stock of human capital using data on the average number of years of schooling in the
population aged 15 or more (EDU).
Political stability is of significance in nurturing the economic climate.  Expensive
and long-gestation investments as in R&D easily get put off if there is political instability.
 This may be especially true if part of the investment is to be made by non-resident
entities.  In other words, political instability is known to contribute greatly to economic
instability. We represent this factor by the comprehensive 'state failure' dummy (ID)
mentioned above.
Even though internal funds are found to be the most important source of
financing private R&D activities, simply because financial institutions will not lend for
such risky ventures (Hall 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994), we might want to11
include the real lending rate of interest (RLR) to reflect the opportunity cost of internal
funds (Guellec and Ioannidis 1997).
Lastly, the trade orientation of a country might be of significance in determining
the pace of its inventive activity; for relatively open economies face more competition
and may, therefore, be forced to invest more in research and development (Edwards
1992; World Bank 1987; Krueger 1978; Bhagwati 1978).  While several different
measures such as exports shares, trade shares, effective tariff rates, real exchange rate
distortions etc. have been used to represent trade orientation, one that seems to be
preferred is the black market exchange rate premium (Gould and Gruben 1996).  We
represent trade orientation, therefore, by a black market premium dummy (BMPD),
which equals 1 for the relatively closed economies (or those for which the black market
premium
11 exceeds the sample median), and 0 for the others.
From the above discussion it should be clear that we first estimate the equation
PRDIt = f(St-1, ∆GDPPCt, EDUt, IDt, RLRt, BMPDt)( 1 )
to derive estimated values of PRDI, i.e. PRDIHATt.  Using this instrumental variable, in
the second step we then estimate the equation
IPt = g(PRDIHATt, St-1, EDUt, IDt, GDPPCt)( 2 )
where all the variables used in these two equations have been defined in the discussion
above. It is this second equation that is of primary interest to us.
3.  Data Set and Methodology
The variables used for estimation were computed using data from diverse
sources (given in Appendix 3).  The sample comprised 31 developed and developing
countries (Table 1); which was determined almost wholly by the availability of data on
private R&D expenditure.  The relationship between the strength of protection and
technological change is likely to be of a long-run nature, because protection laws are
slow to change. So we average the yearly data to get quinquennial averages
12, which
are then used for estimation.  Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in
Appendix 1.
Data on all variables discussed above were available for 29 countries for the12
period 1981-1990.  Averaging these data quinquennially implies two time points for
each country, '1985' or the average for 1981-1985, and '1990' or the average for 1986-
1990, and hence a total of 58 observations.  Estimations employing this sample are
called 'Exercise 1'.  If we agree to drop variable RLR from the estimation of the
instrumental variable PRDIHAT (on the argument that the received I-O literature shows
internal funds, rather than borrowed funds, to be important in determining R&D), our
sample size rises to 30 countries, now including Pakistan for which data on RLR were
not available. Estimations based on this sample are designated 'Exercise 2'.  If we
agree to use the literacy variable LIT in lieu of variable EDU, our sample further
increases to 31 countries, now including Nigeria for which data on EDU were not
available.  Regressions based on this sample are labelled 'Exercise 3'.  Finally,
'Exercise 4' regressions are limited to the 18 OECD countries in our data set
13.  For this
set of countries, data were available for the longer period 1981-1995; however, we had
to use variable LIT in lieu of the human capital variable EDU, because data on the latter
were available only till 1990.  Also, we were forced to use World Bank data (World Bank
2000) for the demand-pull variable ∆GDPPC in place of the Penn World Table (2001),
because the latter only reports data till the early-1990s.
In a large number of applications using cross-country panel data, treating the
individual country effects as 'fixed' appears to be the automatic choice.  Nerlove (1967,
1971), Maddala (1971) and Nickell (1981), however, show that OLS estimates treating
individual effects as fixed may give rather poor parameter estimates.  The advantage
of the random effects specification follows from the substantially higher degrees of
freedom that it affords and, very importantly, from the fact that it makes use of the
'between country' variation in the sample (whereas a 'fixed effects specification does
not).  This latter consideration is likely to be of significance with regard to our data set
for two reasons.  First, the number of cross section units exceeds the number of time
points available by a factor of about 15 - whereas Taylor (1980) shows that even in
situations where this factor is much lower, the random effects estimator is more
efficient.  Second, as pointed out above, changes in the strength of intellectual property
protection in a given country tend to be few and relatively small over the sample period
(and even over longer spans of time), whereas differences in protection levels across
countries (say, the developed and developing countries) are relatively much larger.  For13
all these reasons we prefer to use a random effects specification in our estimation
exercises, i.e.
yit = β 1+ βk xkit + ￿i + εit i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T
where ￿i ~ N(0, σ µ
2)
εit ~ N(0, σ ε
2 )
E￿iεijt = 0, ∀  i, j and t,
E￿i￿j = 0, i ≠  j,
Eεitεjs = 0, i ≠  j, t ≠  s. (2)
where the regressand yit refers to the index of protection variable IP for the i
th country
in the t
th year, while xkit refers to the k
th regressor for the i
th country in the t
th year
14.  The
variables are in (natural) logs, and are stationary; and estimation yields feasible GLS
estimates which are discussed below.
4.  Estimation Results
To begin with we categorize our sample of countries into five groups based on
their private R&D expenditure shares in gross national product (Table 1).  For each
group of countries we also note the index of intellectual property protection and the
average of these indices.  There appears to be an à priori positive relationship between
the R&D expenditure shares and the average indices of protection.  Note, however, that
as we move from group 2 (0.5 ≤  PRDI < 1) through group 5 (2 ≤  PRDI < 2.5), although
the R&D expenditure shares increase substantially, the average index of protection
increases only marginally from about 3.6 to about 3.9. Further, the increase is not
monotonic - while the average R&D expenditure share of group 4 exceeds that of group
3, the index of protection for group 4 is lower than that for group 3.  In any case, to
establish such a relationship with any degree of confidence would require us to
introduce appropriate control variables that may determine the strength of intellectual
property protection that nations provide.  This is what we proceed to do next.
The estimation results of 'Exercise 1'14
The random effects GLS estimates for 'Exercise 1' are presented in Table 2.  We
follow a general-to-specific modelling approach (Charemza and Deadman 1997), and
prefer to use the 'root mean squared error' (R.M.S.E) and 'Schwarz criterion' (SC) to
guide us in model selection
15.  Column (1) of Table 2 (i.e. model (1)) shows that the
education variable has a strong positive effect on the strength of protection provided,
which appears to support our conjecture that countries with relatively larger stocks of
skilled manpower (in the form of competent patent examiners, technicians maintaining
the data bases, patent lawyers, judges etc.) are the ones who are able to provide
relatively higher levels of intellectual property protection.  The instrumental variable
PRDIHAT
16 has a negative and significant influence on the regressand, implying that
countries with higher levels of private R&D expenditure shares provide relatively weaker
protection to intellectual property! But this is just the opposite of the hypothesis that we
set out to investigate, and does not appear to make sense.  Therefore, we must
discount this result, and see whether it is supported or contradicted by those of the
subsequent estimation exercises.
The financial resources variable St-1, however, has the wrong sign even though
it is insignificant. Model (2), therefore, drops this variable.  This does not affect the
results in any way, and variables GDPPC and ID continue to be insignificant. Model (3)
drops the instability dummy variable and model (4) omits both ID and GDPPC.  The
results are essentially unchanged.  This model has the least root mean squared error
and the smallest Schwarz statistic.  The (F-distribution variant of the) Hausman statistic
or m(F) equals 1.744, and has a p-value of 0.175, supporting the estimation of a
random effects specification.
The estimation results of 'Exercise 2'
Table 3 reports the GLS estimation results of 'Exercise 2'.  Model (1) results (i.e.
column (1) of the Table) reveals that all variables, excepting the financial resources
variable St-1, have the expected signs, although none are statistically significant.  Model
(2) omits variable St-1, and model (3) omits both St-1 and the instability dummy ID, but
neither omissions change the results.  Finally, model (4) also drops EDU.  We now find
that variable GDPPC is positive and marginally significant; appearing to support the15
conjecture that a larger profit potential, indicated by a larger market, may induce nations
to provide stronger protection.  The instrumental variable PRDIHAT
17, however,
continues to be statistically insignificant, although it has the expected positive sign.
Model (4) has the minimum root mean squared error and also minimizes the Schwarz
criterion.  The (F-distribution variant of the) Hausman statistic m(F) equals 7.415 with
a p-value of 0.001, and does not appear to support the random effects specification;
however, a fixed effects model gives us virtually the same results (although for various
reasons mentioned above we should eschew a fixed effects specification in this
context).
The estimation results of 'Exercise 3'
From the 'Exercise 3' regression results presented in Table 4, we find that
GDPPC has a positive and marginally significant effect on the strength of intellectual
property protection that a country provides.  Again, the literacy variable has a positive
effect on the regressand, which is marginally significant using a one-tail test.  The
instrumental variable PRDIHAT
18, the foremost variable of interest to us, is insignificant
although it has the right sign.  Of the other variables, only St-1 has a wrong sign.  So
model (2) drops this variable, but this does not change the earlier results in any
substantive manner.  The only difference is, that the coefficient of PRDIHAT is now
negative, although that does not matter because the variable continues to be
insignificant.  Model (3) also omits the instability dummy variable ID, in addition to St-1.
 This does not change the earlier results either.  The coefficient of the literacy variable
is positive and marginally significant using a one-tail test.  The market-size/profit-
potential variable GDPPC also has a positive and marginally significant influence on the
regressand.  The technological change variable PRDIHAT is still, however, statistically
insignificant. Model (3) has the least root mean squared error and minimizes the
Schwarz criterion.  The (F-distribution variant of the) Hausman statistic m(F) equals
5.484 with a p-value of 0.002, and does not appear to support the random effects
specification.  A fixed effects model, however, gives us the
same results as regards the variable PRDIHAT (although for all the reasons mentioned
above we should eschew a fixed effects specification in this instance).16
The estimation results of 'Exercise 4'
'Exercise 4' restricts the data set to the OECD countries in our sample.  Although
we now have a smaller set of countries (only 18), we have data for a longer time period
1981-1995.  As noted above, however, this sample constrains us to use literacy rates
(LIT) as the human capital variable, because data on EDU were not available till 1995.
 Further, we drop the political instability variable ID from our set of regressors, because
this variable equals 0 for all the OECD countries; so that including it would lead us into
a 'dummy variable trap'.  The random effects GLS estimation results are reported in
Table 5.  From the model (1) results in column (1) we find, that the technological
change variable PRDIHAT
19 exerts a positive and marginally significant influence on the
dependent variable.  The market size variable GDPPC is also positive and significant.
The financial resources variable St-1, however, has the wrong sign.  Model (2),
therefore, omits this variable.  We now find that the literacy variable LIT has a positive
effect on the dependent variable which, albeit, is only significant using a one-tail test.
 Further, the market size variable GDPPC is no longer significant.  More importantly, the
instrumental variable PRDIHAT does not retain even its marginal significance.  Model
(3) further drops variable GDPPC.  We now find that the significance level of the literacy
variable improves somewhat, but variable PRDIHAT continues to remain insignificant.
 The root mean squared error is minimized, but not the Schwarz criterion which, albeit,
is smaller than that of model (2).  The (F-distribution variant of the) Hausman statistic
m(F) equals 1.088 and has a p-value of 0.345, supporting the estimation of a random
effects specification.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper our intent was to investigate the claim, often implicit, that countries
with a relatively higher technological base and exhibiting greater technological change
tend to provide relatively stronger protection to intellectual property, whereas countries
with a weaker and essentially unchanging technological base have no incentive to do
so. Indeed, the latter set of countries may well have an incentive to provide relatively
weaker protection insofar as that facilitates imitation.  We found no evidence to support17
the above-mentioned claim, to the extent that the instrumental variable for technological
change was not found to have a significantly positive influence on the strength of
intellectual property protection provided by nations, even when several pertinent control
variables were allowed for.
Even though we tested the above-mentioned claim made in the literature we,
personally, would not expect it to be upheld.  An important reason for this is, that
intellectual property laws are LAWS, and not merely some economic variable whose
magnitude is automatically determined by the behaviour of the market.  Most important
laws - and certainly those relating to intellectual property - are often the result of long
drawn out debate not just by the experts in the area to which the laws in question may
pertain, but also the executive, the judiciary and sundry other members of the polity.
Changes in laws, therefore, tend to be slow and sometimes incremental, and are often
vexed.  For this reason, one should not expect intellectual property laws to change
'endogenously' with any regularity with respect to changes in the technological base of
the economy.
Our results imply that empirical evidence does not support the assertion, that
developing countries opt for weak protection to allow imitation.  (As a corollary,
researchers need not worry about endogeneity bias when estimating the incentive
effects of intellectual property protection on technological change.)  One would,
therefore, need to look for other explanations for differences in the strength of
protection provided by developing and developed countries.  Our analysis points
towards differences in the human capital resource base and potential market size as
distinct possibilities.  If countries indeed choose the level of protection that suits their
level of development best, coercing them to adopt the same laws under the aegis of the
TRIPs agreement should result in differential enforcement behaviour, with nations which
have low levels of R&D opting for weak enforcement and those having high levels of
R&D opting for strong enforcement.  To the extent that developing countries in any case
exhibit weaker enforcement of protection laws, the forced homogenisation of these laws
under the TRIPs agreement implies that differences in the effectiveness of enforcement
should now widen, or may assume more subtle forms than hitherto.  Tracking such
changes in the years to come should, then, constitute an additional test of the18
hypothesis investigated in this paper.19
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Table 1
Private R&D expenditure and Intellectual Property Protection, 1981-1990
0 ≤≤≤≤  PRDI
* < 0.5 0.5 ≤≤≤≤  PRDI < 1 1 ≤≤≤≤  PRDI < 1.5 1.5 ≤≤≤≤  PRDI < 2 2 ≤≤≤≤ PRDI< 2.5
Country IP
* CountryIP Country IP Country IP Country IP
Indonesia 0.330 Canada 2.760 Finland 2.950 Sweden 3.685 Japan 3.940
Venezuela 1.350 Norway 3.290 U.K. 3.570
Mexico 1.515 S. Africa3.570 S. Korea 3.775
India 1.550 Denmark3.830 France 3.900
Thailand 1.850 Austria 4.025 Belgium 3.975
Portugal 1.980 Italy 4.050 Netherlands 4.240










Av. IP 2.306 3.588 3.847 3.685 3.940
Note: 
* PRDI - Share of private R&D investment in GNP; IP - Index of protection.23
Table 2
'Exercise 1' - Random Effects GLS Estimates; Dependent Variable: IP
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
St-1         -0.040        
       (-0.512)       
EDU          0.354          0.347          0.341          0.361
        (2.666)         (2.688)         (2.698)         (3.555)
GDPPC          0.019          0.010          0.017
        (0.296)         (0.167)         (0.297)
ID         -0.077         -0.685
       (-0.630)        (-0.575)
PRDIHAT         -0.002         -0.002         -0.002         -0.002
       (-3.827)        (-3.824)        (-3.813)        (-3.879)
Intercept          0.416          0.386          0.332          0.447
        (0.861)         (0.828)         (0.757)         (2.051)
R.M.S.E          0.2760          0.2519          0.2117         0.0578
SC          0.0017          0.0015          0.0014         0.0013
F(H0: all slopes 0)         43.2760        50.7420         61.5550      82.3930
R
2          0.3565          0.3591           0.3603        0.3690
Observations        58        58         58       58
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses24
Table 3
'Exercise 2' - Random Effects GLS Estimates; Dependent Variable: IP
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
St-1        -0.156
      (-1.089)
EDU         0.110         0.079          0.077
       (1.238)        (1.008)         (1.004)
GDPPC         0.077         0.075          0.087          0.114
       (1.002)        (1.037)         (1.294)         (1.818)
ID        -0.127        -0.090
      (-0.862)       (-0.653)
PRDIHAT         0.377         0.246          0.219          0.247
       (1.520)        (1.095)         (1.001)         (1.128)
Intercept         0.473         0.015         -0.082         -0.193
       (0.635)        (0.029)        (-0.167)        (-0.397)
R.M.S.E         0.6714         0.3671          0.3032         0.2889
SC         0.0026         0.0021          0.0019         0.0018
F(H0: all slopes 0)        33.1100        34.5330        42.3280       56.8280
R
2         0.1369         0.1080          0.1129         0.1149
Observations        60        60         60         60
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses25
Table 4
'Exercise 3' - Random Effects GLS Estimates; Dependent Variable: IP
Variable (1) (2) (3)
St-1            -0.052
          (-0.459)
LIT             0.080             0.078            0.083
           (1.398)            (1.399)           (1.504)
GDPPC             0.138             0.135            0.127
           (1.860)            (1.966)           (1.896)
ID            -0.030            -0.056
          (-0.285)           (-0.805)
PRDIHAT             0.088            -0.099            -0.097
           (0.248)           (-0.301)           (-0.301)
Intercept            -0.218            -0.249            -0.193
          (-0.396)           (-0.529)           (-0.420)
R.M.S.E             0.4628             0.3419             0.3240
SC             0.0026             0.0020             0.0018
F(H0: all slopes 0)           33.4230           36.0130           44.0450
R
2            0.0972             0.0914             0.0945
Observations           62            62            62
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses26
Table 5
'Exercise 4' – Random Effects GLS Estimates; Dependent Variable: IP
Variable (1) (2) (3)
St-1            -0.393
          (-3.155)
LIT             0.433            2.352            2.538
           (0.241)           (1.321)           (1.533)
GDPPC             0.218            0.119
           (2.096)           (1.094)
PRDIHAT             0.172            0.076            0.113
           (1.747)           (0.765)           (1.166)
Intercept            -3.102          -11.516          -10.343
          (-0.390)          (-1.465)           (-1.352)
R.M.S.E            66.5050           64.9655            61.2764
SC             0.0071             0.00811             0.00806
F(H0: all slopes 0)          193.6030          216.2680          316.3610
R
2             0.3620             0.2473             0.2473
Observations            54            54            54
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses27
Appendix 1
Means and standard deviations of the variables, 1981-90









     






PRDI: Private (or non-public) R&D expenditure as a proportion of GNP (%)
RDI: R&D expenditure as a percentage share of GNP (%) (used to compute PRDI)
GOVSHRD: Government share of gross domestic R&D expenditure (%) (used to
compute PRDI)
St-1: Real savings share of GDP (at 1985 international prices), lagged one period (%)
∆GDPPC: Real GDP per capita (chain index in 1985 international prices) as a
proportion of the previous period real GDP per capita (US $$)
EDU: Average number of schooling years in population over 15 (years)
LIT: Total literacy rate in population over 15 (%)
IP: Index of patent protection
BMPD: Black market exchange rate premium dummy
ID: Political instability dummy
RLR: Real lending rate of interest (%)29
Appendix 3
Data sources
RDI: World Bank (2000)
GOVSHRD: United Nations (1999)
St-1: Heston et.al. (2001)
∆GDPPC: Heston et.al. (2001), and World Bank (2000) (for 'Exercise 4' regressions).
EDU: Barro and Lee (2000)
LIT: World Bank (2000)
IP: Ginarte and Park (1997)
BMPD: Pick's Currency Yearbook and World Currency Yearbook (various years)
ID: Esty et.al. (1998)
RLR: World Bank (2000)30
Notes
                                          
1. Although there are numerous studies, theoretical as well as empirical, that focus on the reverse
causality running from the strength of intellectual property protection to the intensity of the innovative effort
(see Evenson 1990 and the references therein, Gould and Gruben 1996, Park and Ginarte 1997,
Schankerman 1998, Lanjouw and Cockburn 2001, Sakakibara and Branstetter 2001).
2. It is of some interest that the authors thank the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (presumably
in their home country) for support for their paper.
3. Especially in the absence of adequate import opportunities given foreign exchange constraints (as is
true of most non-oil-exporters).
4. 'Geographical Indications' are a new form of protection mooted under the TRIPs agreement, whereby
the name of a particular product 'indicates' that the product emanates from a particular region (of the
world). Famous examples include Basmati rice (from India and Pakistan), Champagne (from the French
province of the same name), Scotch (from Scotland), and many others. These names, by implication, may
not be used by producers of other similar but essentially different products, in order to protect the
association of the (supposed or real) characteristics of the products in question with their names.
5. Of course, the implementation and enforcement of trademarks and copyrights may show substantial
variation across countries, but data on these aspects is the most difficult to come by and incorporate in
any index of protection.
6. Patent applications are published by patent offices in official gazettes.
7. Rapp and Rozek (1990) provide an alternative index. Their index is based on a comparison of the
patent laws of individual countries with the guidelines proposed by the US Chamber of Commerce's
Intellectual Property Task Force (presented in Guidelines for Standards for the Protection and
Enforcement of Patents). The Ginarte-Park index is superior in many respects, as it looks into various
facets of patent protection in greater detail, and therefore makes for greater variation in the index of
protection even between the developed countries.
8. R&D data were available as proportions of GNP and not GDP, but the discrepancy should be
unimportant.
9. Griliches (1990) finds evidence of a strong relationship between R&D expenditure and patent numbers
(see also Pavitt (1982) and Kortum (1997); and Trajtenberg (1990) who forwards an alternative viewpoint).
10. Looking ahead for a moment, we use the difference operator ’∆’ because we measure the variables
in logs, so that the ratio of current to lagged GDP per capita becomes a change in (log) GDP per capita.
11. The black market exchange rate premium is computed as (BMR - OR)/OR, where BMR is the black
market exchange rate and OR is the official exchange rate (both measured in local currency per US
dollar).
12. Data on variables IP and EDU were in any case quinquennial.
13. Our OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) sample includes Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. We do not include Mexico and Korea,
because these joined the OECD as recently as 1994 and 1996, respectively.
14. One of the 'x-variables' is the instrumental variable PRDIHAT. We derived this variable using both the
random effects and fixed effects specifications, but that made no difference to the estimation results for
equation (2).31
                                                                                                                                  
15. We must not, however, be doctrinaire about the model selection procedure, because theory is not well-
defined enough to spell out either the complete model or the base model to start off with.
16. The regression results for equation (1), that is for the instrumental variable PRDIHAT, are
PRDI = 0.126 St-1 + 0.339 ∆GDPPC + 0.531 EDU + 0.105 ID + 0.012 BMPD + 0.037 RLR
        (0.702)       (1.828)                 (1.818)           (0.379)       (0.191)             (0.719)
where the intercept coefficients have not been reported as there are too many. The t-statistics are given
in parentheses. As mentioned in note 13, we estimated the instrumental variable using both the random
effects and fixed effects specification, but that made no difference to the subsequent estimation results.
The only reason we used the latter was the high correlation that this gave between PRDI and PRDIHAT
(0.990).
17. The regression results for equation (1), that is for the instrumental variable PRDIHAT, are
PRDI = 0.244 St-1 + 0.257 ∆GDPPC + 0.031 EDU + 0.765 ID - 0.462 BMPD
            (1.270)       (1.771)                  (0.256)           (2.829)     (-4.021)
where the intercept coefficients have not been reported as there are too many. The t-statistics are given
in parentheses. As mentioned in note 13, we estimated the instrumental variable using both the random
effects and fixed effects specification, but that made no difference to the subsequent estimation results.
The only reason we used the latter was the high correlation that this gave between PRDI and PRDIHAT
(0.994).
18. The regression results for equation (1), that is for the instrumental variable PRDIHAT, are
PRDI = 0.170 St-1 + 0.357 ∆GDPPC + 0.367 LIT - 0.093 ID + 0.006 BMPD
            (0.948)        (2.051)                 (0.774)       (-0.476)       (0.105)
where the intercept coefficients have not been reported as there are too many. The t-statistics are given
in parentheses. As mentioned in note 13, we estimated the instrumental variable using both the random
effects and fixed effects specification, but that made no difference to the subsequent estimation results.
The only reason we used the latter was the high correlation that this gave between PRDI and PRDIHAT
(0.989).
19. The regression results for equation (1), that is for the instrumental variable PRDIHAT, are
PRDI = 0.788 St-1 - 0.637 ∆GDPPC + 14.049 LIT + 0.088 BMPD
            (3.120)      (-3.279)                (3.680)          (1.888)
where the intercept coefficients have not been reported as there are too many. The t-statistics are given
in parentheses. As mentioned in note 13, we estimated the instrumental variable using both the random
effects and fixed effects specification, but that made no difference to the subsequent estimation results.
The only reason we used the latter was the high correlation that this gave between PRDI and PRDIHAT
(0.972).
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